On October 23 1962, a prominent Romanian delegation arrived in the Kremlin to meet with Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev. Your host is in a bad mood. The strongman was by nature rude and suspicious. He spent sleepless nights discussing with the Bureau what to do in the escalating crisis. Khrushchev himself was responsible: his secret installation of a nuclear weapons system and some 40,000 Soviet troops in Cuba this summer.
Air reconnaissance discovered American installations on October 14:
In a televised address eight days later, President Kennedy announced a marine quarantine to block additional weapons to the island. All – except perhaps Fidel Castro, who enjoys Havana’s role at the centre of world events. It is concerned that any demonstration of aggression or misjudgment could trigger an apocalyptic nuclear exchange.
At a reception in their honour, Romania watched the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Malinovsky. To turn to his boss with bad news: The US Navy is on alert and preparing for a blockade. “Khrushchev was furious,” reported Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, a Romanian communist leader, later to the Romanian secret service. The Prime Minister “shouted, cursed and issued an avalanche of conflicting orders”. He threatened to “bomb” the White House and swear loudly every time someone mentioned America or an American.
The extensive literature on the Cuban Missile Crisis makes it the case in various disciplines. The intelligence analysis, nuclear cohesion, game theory, organizational psychology. This literature covers the Kremlin eruption on October 23 – which appeared in the centre of the Great by Sergi Plohi.
“Nuclear Ignorance: The History of the Cuban Crisis”:
It appears to have made a significant contribution: an eyewitness account of one of the saga’s two prominent leaders. By showing uncontrolled anger and delirium. Khrushchev’s threat to the White House’s “nuclear weapons”, “an avalanche of conflicting orders”. It is the most disturbing behaviour imaginable for any leader “dealing with” such a crisis.
Indeed, a review of several previously recognized studies. Such as Michael Beschlos’ The Crisis Years (1991), Michael Dobbs’ One Minute to Midnight (2008), and the 1971 revised edition of Graham T. Alison’s classic political science classics. In the decision (1999, co-written by Philip Zelikov), neither of them mentioned this shocking scene. Or the one Giorgio-Dej witnessed at breakfast the following day. This time the bad news came from Vladimir Semichastni of the KGB. A cable that reported that Kennedy had cancelled a trip to Brazil to monitor the quarantine. Harvard History Professor, Mr Plohi, delivered this report based on Georgi-Dezh’s report. “Khrushchev’s face turned red as he read the cable. He began to” curse like a bartender. “Throwing the paper on it on the ground and stomping his heels on it. This viper, “he shouted, calling Kennedy a” millionaire whore. “
Another passage not mentioned in the previous book relates to the confession of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov. “From the start of the crisis there was fear in the Soviet leadership. About the possibility of further development, and it grew with the passage of time. “
Russian and Ukrainian sources are frequently quoted in Plohi’s notes: KGB declassification documents. The memoirs of Soviet apparatchik retirees, studies by Russian scholars, many of which are new to English readers. Such a scope of reference conveys the scope of the author’s research. And it explains how he can add so much to a documentary on such a complex subject.
“Nuclear Nonsense” is an extraordinary, exciting and terrifying scientific achievement:
It is certainly one of the most important books. And 20th-century international relations.
The critical conclusion here – that the United States and the United States. It’s overwhelmed with lousy information, are making decisions in the dark – is well illustrated, if not new. Other arguments seem less convincing. Mr Plokhy described the October 1962 reexamination as helpful in correcting current nuclear proliferation. The timeliness of the final day for which this book, a milestone in the field of research, was unnecessary.
He complained about the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Power Treaty. He signed by President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987. Aside from a few general political rules, Plohi doesn’t know how American politicians. With an expired entity, an agreement that the Russian Federation no longer respects.
Although never explicitly mentioned, the great lesson from nuclear stupidity is that authoritarianism undermines decision-making. Mr Plohi recounted how Soviet air force commander Sergei Biryuzov. Who had previously been dispatched to Havana. It is mistakenly convinced Khrushchev that Cuban soil would hide missiles from U-2 flights.
Biriuzov knows better, but “he may feel like he has no choice,” wrote Plohi. This lack of openness complicates the inherent shortcomings of the Soviet leadership. His interactions with the Bureau “were not like the ExCom meetings,” the author said, referring to the National Security Council. Which Kennedy convened to discuss the crisis. With a few exceptions. The Soviet officials were expected to “approve and approve or keep silent” of Khrushchev’s decisions.